SUMMONS + COMPLAINT January 28, 2015 (2024)

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(FILED: RICHMOND COUNTY CLERK 0172872015 04:44 PM INDEX NO. 135074/2015NYSCEF DOC. NO. 1 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/28/2015 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF RICHMOND THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA ORIGINAL FILED WITH THE THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS THRUSTEE CLERK ON FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006- Index No.: HY12, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-HY12 MORTGAGED PREMISES: 198 CHELSEA STREET Plaintiff, STATEN ISLAND, NY 10307 Vv. Block: 7911 Lot: 34 YELENA GERTS ; VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS; BANK OF SUMMONS AMERICA, N.A. ; JOHN DOE (Unknown Tenants/Occupants of the subject property being set forth to represent any and all occupants of the subject property being foreclosed herein, and any parties, entities of any kind, if any, having or claiming an interest or lien upon the mortgaged property), Defendants. TO THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANTS: YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED to answer the Complaint in the above captioned action and to serve a copy of your Answer on the Plaintif{’s attorney within twenty (20) days after the service of this Summons, exclusive of the day of service, or within thirty (30) days after completion of service where service is made in any other manner than by personal delivery within the State. The United States of America, if designated as a Defendant in this action may answer or appear within sixty (60) days of service hereof. In case of your failure to appear or answer, judgment will be taken against you by default for the relief demanded in the Complaint, NOTICE YOU ARE IN DANGER OF LOSING YOUR HOME Ifyou do not respond to this Summons and Complaint by serving a copy of the Answer on the attorney for the mortgage company who filed this foreclosure proceeding against you and filing the Answer with the Court, a default judgment may be entered and you can lose your home.Speak to an attorney or go to the Court where your case is pending for further information on how to answer the Summons and protect your pro perty.Sendinga payment to your mortgage company will not stop thisforeclosure action.YOU MUST RESPOND BY SERVING A COPY OF THE ANSWERON THE ATTORNEY FOR THE PLAINTIFF (MORTGAGECOMPANY) AND FILING THE ANSWER WITH THE COURT.RICHMOND COUNTY is designated as the place of trial. The basis of venue is the location ofthe mortgaged premises foreclosed herein.Dated: \- RY-1 Ss Pree Margaret J. ascino, Esq Lan Stacey A. Weisblatt, Esq. Alexandra T. Saites, Esq. Todd N. Robinson, Esq. Stern & Eisenberg, PC Attomeys for Plaintiff 485 A Route | South, Suite 110 Woodbridge Corporate Center Iselin, NJ 08830 T: (516) 630-0288 Counsel for PlaintiffNOTICE PURSUANT TO THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACTTHIS FIRM IS A DEBT COLLECTOR ATTEMPTING TO COLLECT A DEBT. THISNOTICE IS SENT TO YOU IN AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT THE INDEBTEDNESSREFERRED TO HEREIN AND ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM YOU WILL BEUSED FOR THAT PURPOSE. Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receivin ig this notice that you dispute thevalidity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this debt is valid. Tfyou notifythis office in writing within 30 days from receiving this notice, this office will obtain verificationof the debt or obtain a copy of a judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification.If you request this office in writing within 30 days after recviving this notice this office willprovide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the currentcreditor.IF YOU ARE CURRENTLY PROTECTED BY THE FILING OF A PETITION INBANKRUPTCY, THE ENCLOSED LETTER/NOTICE IS FOR INFORMATION PURPOS ESONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN ATTEMPT TO COLLECT A DEBT.IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED A DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY (AFTER ENTERING INTOTHE RELEVANT MORTGAGE NOTE AND MORTGAGE (OR OTHER SECUREDOBLIGATION) AND HAVE NOT REAFFIRMED THE DEBT) THEN THISCORRESPONDENCE IS NOT AND SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS AN ATTEMPT TOCOLLECTA DEBT, BUT SOLELY AS PART OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF THEMORTGAGE/LIEN AGAINST REAL PROPERTY (SECURED PROPERTY).SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK. COUNTY OF RICHMOND THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA ORIGINAL FILED WITH THE THE BANK OF NEW YORK, AS THRUSTEE CLERK ON FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2006- Index No.: HY 12, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-HY 12, MORTGAGED PREMISES: 198 CHELSEA STREET Plaintiff, STATEN ISLAND, NY 10307 Vv. Block: 7911 Lot: 34YELENA GERTS ; VLADISLAV GERTSAIK/A VLADISLAV QO. GERTS ; BANK OFAMERICA, N.A.; JOHN DOE (Unknown,Tenants/Occupants of the subject propertybeing set forth to represent any and alloccupants of the subject property beingforeclosed herein, and any parties, entities ofany kind, if any, having or claiming an interestor lien upon the mortgaged property), Defendants. COMPLAINT — MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE Plaintiff, THE BANK. OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK,AS THRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOANTRUST 2006-HY 12, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2006-HY 12,(herein after referred to as “BAC BANK OF NY (CWALT 2006-HY12)”), by and through itsCounsel, Stern & Eisenberg, PC, does hereby bring the within Complaint against the Defendantsand upon information and belief, alleges as follows: 1. Plaintiff is the holder of a note and mortgage being foreclosed in this action and is duly organized under the laws of the United States. 2. Defendants YELENA GERTS and VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS (“Defendants”), are, upon information and belief, adult individuals with a last- known address of 2630 Cropsey Ave, Brooklyn, NY 11214.3. On 05/15/2006, YELENA GERTS and VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS executed and delivered to COUNTRY WIDE HOME LOANS, INC. a note in the amount of $620,000.00 in which Defendants agreed to repay the unpaid principal balance together with accrued interest and such other amounts until paid (“Note”). A copy of the Note is attached hereto as Exhibit “A” and is incorporated herein by reference as though set forth at length herein. To secure repayment of the Note, YELENA GERTS and VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS executed and delivered a Consolidated Mortgage to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. MERS acting solely as a nominee for Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. on the real property located at 198 CHELSEA ST, STATEN ISLAND, NY 10307 (the “Property”) to secure the payment of the sum of $620,000.00 (the “Consolidated Mortgage”) which consolicated the prior mortgage recorded in Richmond County Clerk’s Office on May 16, 2005 in Instrument Land Doc No. 43673. . Said Consolidated Mortgage was recorded in the Richmond County Clerk’s office on September 20, 2006 in Instrument Land Doc No. 151606 at which time the mortgage recording tax was duly paid. Said agreement consolidates with Mortgage in Land Doc No. 43673, as assigned in Land Doc No. 142379. A copy of the Modification Agreement is attached as Exhibit “B” and is incorporated herein by reference as though set forth at length herein. Prior to the commencement of this action, the Consolidated Mortgage was assigned to the within Plaintiff, by Assignment of Mortgage. A copy of the recorded Assignment of Mortgage is attached as Exhibit “C” and is incorporated herein by reference as though set forth a length herein. The mortgaged premises being foreclosed (the Property) is more fully described in Exhibit “D” annexed hereto and made a part hereof. The tax map designation is known as or part of SBL No,: 7911-34. Defendants YELENA GERTS and VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS have failed to comply with the terms of the Note and Mortgage by failing to pay the monthly payment due on 05/01/2012 and each subsequent payment that has come due, together with any other amounts for taxes, assessments, water rents, escrow and/or any other charges that have come due and are payable under the terms of the Note andMortgage since the date of default set forth above. Accordingly, Plaintiff elects to call due the entire amount secured by the Mortgage. As of November 10, 2014, the following amounts are due and owing pursuant to the terms of the Note and Mortgage: Principal Balance: $616,996.52 Interest to 11/30/2014 $113,067.73 Escrow Advances: . $13,068.09 Insurance: 11,230.00 Taxes: 8,906.15 Late Charges: 706.91 together with accrued interest and any other amounts advanced for taxes, insurance, maintenance of the Property, together with other amounts that come due and allowed pursuant to the terms of the Note and Mortgage, including, but not limited to costs, allowances and reasonable attorney’s fees. During the course of this action, the Plaintiff (directly and/or through its agents) may be obligated to make advances for the payment of taxes, insurance premiums and necessary expenses to preserve the security, and such sums advanced under the terms of the note, together with interest (to the extent allowed), are to be added to the amount due on the mortgage debt and secured by the Plaintiff’s Mortgage.10. The defendants identified more fully on Exhibit “E”, attached hereto and incorporated herein, are alleged to have or otherwise claim to have some interest in or lien upon said mortgaged Property, which interest and/or lien has accrued subsequent to (or otherwise equitably or duly subordinated to) the lien of Plaintiff’s Mortgage.ll Defendants John Doe are occupants of the Property being foreclosed, or any persons or entities of any kind otherwise claiming a lien or other interest in or against the Property whose interest and/or lien is subordinate to the lien held by Plaintiff.12 If applicable, the Mortgage was originated in compliance with Banking Law Sections 595-a, 6-1 and/or 6-m and the Plaintiff has complied with ali appropriate provisions of Section 595-a of the Banking law and any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder, including Section 6-1 and 6-m, and section 1304 of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law.13. That prior to the commencement of this action, Plaintiff sent notice to YELENA GERTS and VLADISLAV GERTS A/K/A VLADISLAV O. GERTS in accordance with the terms of RPAPL 1304, if applicable. Copies of said Notices are attached as Exhibit “G”. Further, if necessary, said notice has been registered in accordance with RPAPL 1306. 14. (Sale Request”) In the event this action proceeds to judgment in foreclosure and sale of the Property, Plaintiff requests that the Property be sold subject to any statement of facts an inspection of the Property would disclose or an accurate survey of the Property would show; covenants, restrictions, easem*nts and public utility agreements of record, if any; building and zoning ordinances and possible violations of same; any rights of tenants or persons in possession of the Property; any equity/right of redemption of the United States of America within 120 days of the sale; and, any prior morigages and liens, if any. If the Mortgage secures more than one property, Plaintiff requests the judgment in foreclosure provide for the sale of the properties in a particular order to the extent necessary to satisfy the amounts due as determined by this Court. 15. There are no other pending proceedings to enforce the referenced Note and Mortgage. To the extent there was any prior proceeding, it is the intention of the Plaintiff that any such action be discontinued and the instant action be the only pending action. 16. Pursuant to the terms of the Mortgage, upon default, Plaintiff is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs incurred as a result of Defendants' default. Therefore, Plaintiff demands payment of its attorneys’ fees and costs to be incurred in connection with this action. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff, BAC BANK OF NY (CWALT 2006-HY 12), demandsjudgment: 1 Fixing the amounts due the Plaintiff for all amounts due under the Note and Mortgage, including, but not limited to principal, interest, costs, late charges, expenses of sale, allowances and disbursem*nts, reasonable attorney’s fees (to the extent allowed under the Note and/or Mortgage) and all other monies advanced and paid which are secured by the Mortgage; That the Defendants and all parties claiming by, through or under them and every other person or entity whose right, title, conveyance or encumbrance is subsequent to orsubsequently recorded, or whose lien is being challenged by being a Defendant in this action, be barred and foreclosed of and from all right, claim, lien, interest or equity of redemption in and to said Property; That said Property, or such part thereof as may be necessary to raise the amounts due herein, be decreed to be sold according to law subject to the provisions of the Sale Request paragraph above; That out of the monies arising from the sale of the Property, the Plaintiff may be paid the amounts due on said Note and Mortgage, plus all other amounts provided for and allowed under the judgment, together with any sums expended as aforesaid, with interest as allowed by law upon any advances from the dates of the respective advance payments, to the extent allowed; That either or any of the parties to this action may become a purchaser upon such sale; That this Court, if requested, forthwith appoint a receiver of rents and profits of said Property with the usual powers and duties;That the Defendants referred to in paragraph 3 of this Complaint (and any original orsubsequent obligors so named in this action) may be adjudged to pay any deficiency thatmay remain after applying all of said monies so applicable thereto, unless the debt hasbeen listed and discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding, in which case no deficiencyjudgment will be sought.In the event Plaintiff possesses any other liens against the Property, they shall NOT bemerged with the same/instant matter, Plaintiff specifically reserves its right to share inany surplus monies arising from sale of the Property by virtue of its position as ajudgment or other lien creditor, excluding the Mortgage being foreclosed herein.9. That the Plaintiff be granted such other and further relief as may be just, equitabl e and proper.Dated: 29 AS J “4 & Margaret J. Castino, Esq. Sfacey A. Weisblatt, Esq. Alexandra T. Saites, Esq. Todd N. Robinson, Esq. Stern & Eisenberg, PC Attorneys for Plaintiff 485 A Route 1 South, Suite 110 Woodbridge Corporate Center Iselin, NJ 08830 T: (516) 630-0288 Counsel for PlaintiffI, Stacey Weisblatt, of the firm of Stern & Eisenberg, PC, am an attorney licensed to practice inthe State of New York, and counsel for Plaintiff, and hereby certify that, to the best of myknowledge, information and belief, formed after reasonable inquiry regarding the present action,the presentation of the pleadings, affidavit (and motion if applicable), or the contentionscontained herein are not frivolous as defined in 22 NYCRR 130-1.1 (¢ i ( rN,‘, iv & hE [MyrEXHIBIT A~ —s aePrumpearnet oy, At ANDES FAROE pee ADIUSVATRILE BATE ES a One Aen LoTR CONe Tnetese CAs Poblinivcet by Pie Wall Stecee Fouenatey Rate ©:a aD) S Tne srestOnyGONsOL TDA BD ADOH a a MAR wes 5 Meow. aac ct cant wasn » anedte teasesanae naeaa qaven Te 2 Glos pie ees en zor hn Lees Soe anet MeGLekevat ome Meester a Freed soa > Seemn © ele eed hase A ag ene » Ne DI ve ce Saleen Sink rae nae Metis. THIS NOTE GONTAING PROVISIONS ALLOWING FOR A CHANGE IN my FDCER INTEREST RAT TO AN ADIUS TAL NOT JNTEREST RATE AND FOR CHANGES IN MY MONTHLY PAYMENT, THIS BATTS “Tet Sinn: hans Tees MAXIMACINHLNT PEATWY | ADJUSTABLE ANUS ” INTEREST RATE GAN GHANGE AT ANY ONE ae Ls, BOOS SeATEN ranann sae TORK [pated (eaeyy (teed 26 crmmams sate we nants, wre LOMO? —-aTAS EXoponty aulneecond . BORO WIS PRONTO RAK In rei urn for Mall Nave cceckved, E pres tw ys 2D,000.00 his amount is calted “Principe .Dluren :interest. ae tois theHOE order of Lende: LenderTi eanice Hf paynonte under LOANS, “Rees . thin Boece 1 Hue form of cash, check or money ord saderstand that Lender ony tan ong. Lene or anyone who tates tis Note by cant: SE WO Who ds matibed 6toceive payment: ander this Note 4 6 AHedl the “Mote 1faider2 SPEEA Thier WATT be Charged en earepitel pr peipal WHOL the Call amount OF Principal fee: been paid i. La pay interent ata yeariyrate of as crest rate I with pay miny change in accordance with Section | of tin Nate. “The inte, epired by this 5Seetion 2 and Section 4 or this Note is the eate Fill pay both betor weet after Ly ae akeGancribad in Section VON) oF thie het . BAYES (AQ "Mime DAG} mniesuidce pawaveasre ince of Onraymentsefore the iene Pemesthe iterent due on the tnpaid tt Revenant sats Payment ue Cate day ete ofried every menth, besinn Me Se on were ° Waar cele Tague, way pnyriaeey wiltBoon yen we onty oFavery me Ab ne provided Below principal balines of diin Kote. 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X will poy boginOinE on the frst monthly payment date vLiee she Change Tovte wnt oa Se IONNT Of theony amount of my new cpombty payment MantbIy prymen! changes Heal. (2) Notice ef Guanes Uctoreme x neue! ot aw the eftective date Of any change mange Lreeene £9 and/or monthly paymerrt, the Mot bolder will de oe mall to change. The Saochetae i Jnetuce infocus hon recused by tars "rove phone mimo, = Date of ara ie Zon who will answer ney question Luay Nav Kenording the wetice. BION tome An sles the th ae Gate or my a cheat arened Xaalercese Wangyara canePayenent Due Date") niall be the BestHL cOnnining Of TOUT prktt upon ADA imerent an Mus Not tthe “Bisse Poneipal and meter moathis payment date ag rer the Put Change IDate.5. BORROWER'S RICE LO PEAS A have the cieht wo maice prymnenes ok Pxineip: At ANY tine before rhe; yas die. A payment of Principa Sonty is known a9“yrapayment.”payee 3 Woher epiyinene T rmalee i et agaert. T whit teil cae Evoke Phere FF have HOF sited U1 its MOREnT yr * ni due weve # thts 2 te Bou: an doing nee Uiaay Gor desigente @a oF a a Prepay on uinl Prepayment witiacrase sine ae ny Brepasns:ray Brcpayrneayt Lo reduceXropayment 1 we acerged the amen Gf Prine dint d owe wae copayment mount Fore, taowever, ares e. 1 Thie Folder Mote Holder wilt usePrincip, tL arnount of the Note. gadIF Lene Unpaid antecest en the n partial Prepay herove PPIyangs th wy ‘Nowe payenent mins appry to rextace ray theUnines the Note Folder aprann i weitings to tone ol Rent. ero Will be ne ehiges we the due x te oF Wy romhiy payoeatpayin 2 eon. AT the parte Peeps vincent Made during tre pe od wher wy rmontpuyment cen ist Ofonly NyOf interect. butenout. U6 won of the monthly payment wilt cetr re for whe mnaindice oF a IF the partial (ey in mide eartng ta pores when my payment: con fetornor when hiy eyADU interest, my partial Peopmyaent may rechuc the payment atnout Of my Monty proenes free gee Tne € prtaeigedpordnl Prepayenene. Tewever, nity reduction dus ro my paral Brapayment miy be otter by Rintered! catengehere: Date Following tay6 Laat N CHARGESroan che; Inew, Sehte apt te Oia loan andl which nets maximum Ioan chanses, is finely Interpreted a then a) isteoxyUe such interert oF ote WOH ses reetnee Migetect Ge 10 be alt ir connection witht reduce Use Ghar (©Teasethe esepererite(he at pernausd Vieni anne deen wae chassemeu Sxereded pe niieced Tent fe wilt wybu toretanded by the armenia me. The Note [older sy Hoorn Co winive dia vefend bySoles CD, any vse b e teed EtonPrin BL owe, vender Hair Mateo by making» hives taPrynient to ene, ares Tarte PEINGES WENCH pil, (he restatlon sell bee trea Hhtel reduc,as a psarBal Prepusiment,” MONONVEERES Ax K) TO RAY AS Roem (ND Foeetas Ctse gon fox Overdue 2: ik the Note thoteee f stow received orriernes the ohare faS1 acAgHT Of Aut sympn Hay pay aan tage he end of earnsdays utter ti diate ACs dee, Lwill catendoroverdue paynient of interest, curingpay.Uen date poriad why > the BOK aay payne Lin interest c. The mmenne oof he clacne WHT be ant, aed ef 49: Apul and intorent a dierent ea t Oh Ot niepay Ohis face Hee progiplls Lut only OnE On eel Inte payTEAL pe Pitt 3) FUT doBe: not piyy Ore fall amnoune of cack fonts payment on the: date iis ae, 2 win te iy detent.eon= he So lore Intweat Grey ADIL FALE MATE MISE, | ONE HGH Eitue3rY eNOEnna meaa (O) Notice of Dermare Ea eiainIf Gate, Tami ofjn detautt, ihe Nowe Molder may seme me a weittcs patice telling ane Mat if Fede nat pay the avertas amount isp a Mote Frotder rary ecciy rene tos pay JenFrterestt 0 fT ows on that amennt vrdelive by ether mes Gnte must be. atwedintely the least 30 dayw afterwnGunt OF Prneipal thie hae not boon paid aia alt the the daw on which the matice ix failed to me oF D) No Waiver By Nets iota, ity ata tire ; when Karn in detautt, Gis Note Helder dows not val gine me te pay immediately his Pall We des cribod above.ihe Notets vontHoldex 5) DayanentWillaf SGIf Ne have eotelare die right to de *so if ta ao nodetauh ata iter Une Sustat suena Wepre me Ax the Mote Holder hos requivedpoia bac bey ere SOe HD Ot jes come me wet toos pennen pay irnneedincedyi pau An de) Sibed abowe, the Mets He Wer wR tea. fy emtorGing: Ihig Mote ko Hig ExtOHe NOL premade, by applicable He Mew. ENE tO be “Phose 1 reo Sate hide, Cor example, reasonable, Ktomneye Teen.s GIVING ox So wees Unless appbenble law reeuives A ditferene meckod. py notice that x et given to moe wer this Nowe: wilt be st ven bytet ivering, it oF by mall pir ty FVolder n nonce gc me sittorene nares.cl*ts om ST to nee Ah the. Peoperty Actress above or ata different mldsens UL give tn ws BEALS intend the Note Molder redutren i Oth ieveMam givengivenby mailing x ROUGE de OFty enAE clone a nad to fhe Nee Mekdcr uyit notiES ferdirrerent that matt be gives to the NM ote Teles inider mic Mots wilt tae Address stated wm Section ICA) abows Oe pt a eaffercn seek ‘% OMLIGAUKIONS Ox PIER SONS UNIDIEE EOS NO oe If more than one person whens Uva ore, cnet:shi 1 ineivcting, (he promnine i pay the fll 2 MOUNT BOM § fully and persenntly obligated te ieap Owed. Aay PErkon Who INH EUaTANtOL, sate ey alor ofcndorner te prone: made i Of dis Mate itASO Oblinnted to ao Cen 2 things. Any person who tale aver tere otalHh: Suntionn. inctuding the obtipador of a yuarantar, ondoriar OF tia Wot f flaw obligated 6 keop al oF Uke prone cite i o Note. ‘The Nets tester 2 ay entgroe sti Ugh: creeunde. Ubin Mote againne aneh poesia neki whence Dy VE nzainat AM ob us togede fe rmenies slat amy ene Ge vis ms yy bres eec*ntired tepay SID of the amgunu owed Under Une Note,Lo. Waryvries X and nay othe: person whe has abbgations under thin Wore Prencabnent” means the righ, wo require the Note Totdes to mond waive the rigtit* of Proxentment and Now, payment of nenenmts due. "Mouce Of Pumas ot enorme 8 Dioeers the,Hight to require the Note Halder to yive nouce to athe persons thar amouat due have not been paid,whe ORF ORE SECIETED NOK “Foie Mote 52 a Mon OA Toirumnent with Benied eadations: ny apee inetNote Holder unaer ria 2a More,fron reeposDeed of Tense, o0this Mere Wroteers the Nore Lotear ic tosses: that rity Deed Che fou™ ets Bon fyAdgition t= Tntrane the nO"), protection dagen the siven te the ne chive ar“Thue Se forty tustuinent doscches how phe re: AMEE T do PP Use pred wider what conditions Tay ‘8fy Wye resend red EO FN Shamediare payearat in Cull oF «Tame in thin Neto,Atmouncl Lowe ander til o Mote. 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Hewever, te opuan ant, NOU be exerctved by 1 erie Pexercice $e srvestaitoin by Hederat Law. netor nen Unis Oper, Tanruer hell ged Borrow notice oF aveere, Auer. Phe netics stetl promiehs a portnd of sot d ae an 30 oust pay AH sheng seewred tyrve heTromy athesavkiy date Ure note ert mn 1 torre F Eaiontance withthes:Section 15 within which Borrovwe: this period, Lender may iriver ny euMediosTrestrnent. 19 pay permitted GY Ud Security Instrament without hurtierte nodee AUIS Prior the expienion OF on cers lon Horse 5) Wher may nin A fixed tan rene ete chines seenta stelee Jnivewen Govern: 18 Of tine Soe fowennet 18 Of the Security lnstiieentTenement shall sie aanersticd Sete Woly. interant rate aader terms sted iy Beer few 4 aves, Wren an roliowar AG > oreeer solid) Uno ore tay tice ian et nrek Wasi leorery * Property’ waster Uf: the Prove or anes leues ry wenericlal tte ban A

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Ruling

CYRUS V. GODFREY, AS TRUSTEE OF THE CYRUS VINCENT GODFREY LIVING TRUST, ET AL. VS ERIN LAREAU, ET AL.

Aug 06, 2024 |21STCV11951

Case Number: 21STCV11951 Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Dept: 54 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Cyrus V. Godfrey, et al., Plaintiffs, Case No.: 21STCV11951 vs. Tentative Ruling Erin Lareau, et al., Defendants. Hearing Date: August 6, 2024 Department 54, Judge Maurice A. Leiter Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Moving Parties: Defendants Erin Lareau, Eric H. Ahola, and Sisu Construction, Inc. Responding Parties: Plaintiffs Cyrus V. Godfrey, individually and as Trustee of the Cyrus Vincent Godfrey Living Trust T/R: DEFENDANTS MOTION IS GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND AS TO DEFENDANTS ERIC H. AHOLA AND SISU CONSTRUCTION, INC. THE MOTION IS DENIED AS TO DEFENDANT ERIN LAREAU. DEFENDANTS TO NOTICE. If the parties wish to submit on the tentative, please email the courtroom at¿SMCdept54@lacourt.org¿with notice to opposing counsel (or self-represented party) before 8:30 am on the day of the hearing. The Court considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply. BACKGROUND On March 15, 2022, Plaintiffs Cyrus V. Godfrey and Cyrus V. Godfrey as Trustee of the Cyrus Vincent Godfrey Living Trust filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants Erin Lareau, Eric H. Ahola, and Sisu Construction, Inc., asserting causes of action for (1) nuisance, (2) negligence, (3) nuisance parties, and (4) covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs). The FAC alleges that Defendants operate a construction business out of Plaintiffs neighbor Lareaus residence and use that residence in such a manner that extremely loud and excessive noise and construction work occurs there, and vibration, including the use of electric saws, electric drills, electric grinding, mechanized equipment, and the like. (FAC. ¶¶ 8, 9.) At the Final Status Conference on April 12, 2024, the Court ordered a jury trial as to the first cause of action for nuisance, second cause of action for negligence, and third cause of action of nuisance, and decided the fourth cause of action would be addressed in a separate bench trial after the jury trial. On May 3, 2024, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants on causes of action one through three. Defendants Lareau, Ahola, and Sisu Construction, Inc. now move for judgment on the pleadings and/or to dismiss as to the fourth cause of action. REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE Defendants ask the Court to take judicial notice of these facts: 1. On April 12, 2024, the Court issued an order limiting the bench trial to the CC&R cause of action and equitable relief flowing therefrom; and 2. To the extent that the CC&Rs apply and were enforceable, the CC&Rs have been revoked and are no longer enforceable. Defendants argue that those facts were established through (A) the Minute Order dated April 12, 2024, and (B) the Revocation of Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions, recorded at the Los Angeles County Recorders Office on May 24, 2024, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit B to the Declaration of Nikhil P. Pole. Although a court cannot take judicial notice of hearsay allegations in a court record, it can take judicial notice of the truth of facts asserted in documents such as orders, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and judgments. (Starr v. Ashbrook (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 999, 1014.) Similarly, [c]ourts can take judicial notice of the existence, content and authenticity of public records and other specified documents, but do not take judicial notice of the truth of the factual matters asserted in those documents. [Citation.] (Dominguez v. Bonta (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 389, 400.) The Court grants the request to take judicial notice of the Minute Order dated April 12, 2024, and the recorded documents. But the Court cannot take judicial notice of the asserted fact that the CC&Rs have been revoked. Plaintiffs hearsay objection to facts asserted in the recorded documents is sustained. ANALYSIS A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant. (CCP § §§ 438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).) The grounds shall appear on the face of the challenged pleading or from any matter of which the court is required to take judicial notice. (CCP § 438(d).) Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999.) The Court finds that the motion is timely. It was served and filed on June 27, 2024, more than 30 days before the second phase of trial scheduled for August 26, 2024. (See CCP § 1005.5 [A motion upon all the grounds stated in the written notice thereof is deemed to have been made and to be pending before the court for all purposes, upon the due service and filing of the notice of motion, but this shall not deprive a party of a hearing of the motion to which he is otherwise entitled.]) Defendants argue that the fourth cause of action is moot because the CC&Rs have been revoked. According to the CC&Rs, a note of a majority of the then owners of the lots & [could] agree[] to change said covenants, conditions and restrictions in whole or in part. (Exhibit A to the FAC, p. 4, ¶ 10.) On May 19, 2024, a majority (i.e., eight out of thirteen) owners signed an agreement to revoke the CC&Rs. On May 24, 2024, the revocation agreement was recorded in the Los Angeles County Recorders Office (Exh. B to the Pole Dec.) As discussed above the Court cannot take judicial notice of these facts and cannot grant the motion on this ground. Defendants next argue that Defendants Ahola and Sisu Construction, Inc. cannot be bound by the CC&Rs because Lareau is the sole owner and in possession of the property, and the CC&Rs bind only the property owners and their heirs, personal representatives, or assigns.[1] As Defendants argue, [w]hat is bound by an equitable servitude enforceable under CC&Rs is a parcel, a lot, in a subdivided tract, not an individual who has no ownership interest in the lot. [Citation.] [W]hen the owner of a subdivided tract conveys the various parcels in the tract by deeds containing appropriate language imposing restrictions on each parcel as part of a general plan of restrictions common to all the parcels and designed for their mutual benefit, mutual equitable servitudes are thereby created in favor of each parcel as against all the others. [Citation.] [Citation.] (Martin v. Bridgeport Community Assn., Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1024, 1036.) The FAC alleges that Defendant ERIN LAREAU & is the sole owner, and in possession and control of, real property consisting of land and improvements constituting a single family residence at the address commonly known as 2645 Desmond Estates Rd., Los Angeles, CA 90046. (FAC, ¶ 2; Shirvanyan v. Los Angeles Community College District (2020) 59 Cal.App.5th 82, 100 [The complaints allegations are a judicial admission that concede the truth of [the] matter and have the effect of removing it from the issues. [Citations]].) The CC&Rs also state: NOW THEREFORE, THE UNDERSIGNED DO HEREBY, as owners of the aforementioned real property, impose on such property, and each and every parcel thereof, the following provisions, restrictions and covenants, hereinafter referred to as covenants, which shall apply to and bind the undersigned and all parties hereafter acquiring title to any of said parcels, their heirs, personal representatives and assigns. (Exhibit A to the FAC, p. 4, ¶ 10.) The FAC does not allege that Ahola and Sisu Corporation are owners of the property, or heirs, personal representatives, or assigns of Lareau. Plaintiffs have not shown they can amend the FAC to allege facts sufficient to show a claim for breach of the CC&Rs against Ahola and Sisu Corporation. The Court grants the motion as to Defendants Ahola and Sisu Corporation without leave to amend. The Court denies the motion as to Defendant Lareau. The parties briefs also address the issue of what relief can be awarded at the bench trial. The fourth cause of action alleges that Defendants breached the CC&Rs by engaging in a business on the Lareau property, which is aggravated by the facts&that the business is noisy, disruptive, and a nuisance. Plaintiffs also allege Defendants breached the CC&Rs by constructing structures not built and maintained exclusively for private residence purposes. (FAC ¶ 40.) In paragraph 41, Plaintiffs seek an injunction stopping this alleged wrongful conduct because there is no adequate remedy at law due to the difficulty of determining the precise amount of damages& In paragraph 42, Plaintiffs seek emotional distress damages for interference with their enjoyment of the property. A party who is damaged by a violation of the CC&R's may seek money damages. (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1385.) Here, however, all of Plaintiffs emotional distress claims arise from alleged interference with their enjoyment of the property caused by noise and disruption. The jury rejected these claims for emotional distress damages in Phase 1 of this trial. Plaintiffs do not allege separate or distinct emotional distress arising solely from the claimed violation of the CC&Rs. The Court will adopt the jurys conclusion on the issue of emotional distress damages; that will not be relitigated at the bench trial. "Issues adjudicated in earlier phases of a bifurcated trial are binding in later phases of that trial and need not be relitigated." (Arntz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 464, 487.) "Where legal claims are first tried by a jury and equitable claims later tried by a judge, the trial court must follow the jury's factual determinations on common issues of fact." (Hoopes v. Dolan (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 146.) The bench trial will be limited to the issues of whether the CC&Rs were properly revoked, and if not, whether the Court should enjoin any ongoing breach of the CC&Rs. [1] The Court rejects Plaintiffs argument that Lareau may not make arguments on behalf of Ahola and Sisu. Their attorneys signed the motion.

Ruling

RICHARD LOPEZ VS RAFAEL DAVID MIRANDA, ET AL.

Aug 08, 2024 |22STCV22815

Case Number: 22STCV22815 Hearing Date: August 8, 2024 Dept: 74 Richard Lopez v. Rafael David Miranda, et al. Plaintiff and Cross-Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment, or alternatively, for Summary Adjudication The court grants Lopezs request for judicial notice. All evidentiary objections are preserved. The court finds that Lopez has carried his prima facie initial burden and Miranda has not shown the existence of one or more triable issues of material fact. Lopez has been the sole rightful legal and equitable owner of the Property continuously since May 2017. (SUF 1.) The Settlement Agreement does not entitle Miranda to any interest in the Property as against Lopez. (SUF 6, 11.) The Improper Default Judgment had been set aside and could not support recording the Trust Transfer Deed. (SUF 17, 22, 23.) As such, the Trust Transfer Deed is void. Because Lopez is entitled to judgment of the first cause of action for quiet title as the Propertys sole rightful legal and equitable owner, cancellation of the Trust Transfer Deed is necessary to clear title and effectuate the judgment for Lopez on the quiet title action. Miranda recorded the Trust Transfer Deed knowing it to be false and without privilege or justification. (SUF 21) Miranda knew that Lopez was no longer a party in the First, Second, or Third Miranda lawsuits when Miranda improperly included in Mirandas proposed default judgment that Lopezs Grant Deed be expunged. (SUF 17.) Miranda did not serve Lopez with his proposed default judgment or the Improper Default Judgment. (SUF 17, 18.) Miranda also refused to apply to amend the Improper Default Judgment to remove the reference to the Property. (SUF 20.) Instead, he clouded the title of the Property by recording the Trust Transfer Deed. (SUF 21.) Lopez has suffered pecuniary loss due to Mirandas recordation of the Trust Transfer Deed. Lopez has incurred $70,934.00 in attorneys fees and $4,652.47 in costs necessary to remove the doubt cast by the Trust Transfer Deed and to clear title. (SUF 24.) Miranda fails to create a triable issue for any of the foregoing. The court grants summary adjudication for Lopez on the first, second, and third causes of action. Plaintiff shall prepare a proposed judgment.

Ruling

EJA ASSOCIATES, L.P., A CALIFORNIA LIMITED PARTNERSHIP VS MUHAMMAD ALI, ET AL.

Aug 09, 2024 |6/18/2022 |21SMCV01421

Case Number: 21SMCV01421 Hearing Date: August 9, 2024 Dept: I The court is inclined to GRANT the application and ask the parties to meet and confer on an acceptable date.

Ruling

WAGNER VS. LLOYD

Aug 10, 2024 |CVCV21-0198602

WAGNER VS. LLOYDCase Number: CVCV21-0198602This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacated by the Court’sorder dated April 2, 2024. The Court previously designated this matter exempt from plan designation. Neitherside has posted jury fees. The parties are granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees inthat time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear to provide theCourt with available trial dates.

Ruling

KEN HOUANG, ET AL. VS ROCHELLE H. STERLING, ET AL.

Aug 07, 2024 |22STCV32478

Case Number: 22STCV32478 Hearing Date: August 7, 2024 Dept: 47 Tentative Ruling Judge Theresa M. Traber, Department 47 HEARING DATE: August 7, 2024 TRIAL DATE: September 26, 2024 CASE: Ken Houang, et al. v. Rochelle H. Sterling, et al. CASE NO.: 22STCV32478 MOTION TO DEEM THE TRUTH OF MATTERS STATED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS AS ADMITTED; REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS MOVING PARTY: Plaintiff Ken Houang RESPONDING PARTY(S): Defendant Rochelle H. Sterling, individually and as trustee of the Sterling Family Trust CASE HISTORY: · 10/04/22: Complaint filed. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS: This is a habitability action. Plaintiffs, who are and were tenants at a residential apartment complex, allege that Defendants permitted the premises to develop extensive uninhabitable conditions and allowed those conditions to persist in violation of statutes and municipal ordinances. Plaintiffs seek monetary and injunctive relief. Plaintiff Ken Houang moves for an order deeming the truth of matters stated in requests for admissions propounded to Defendant Rochelle Sterling as admitted, and for sanctions. TENTATIVE RULING: Plaintiffs Motion for Order Deeming Truth of Matters Stated in Requests for Admissions is GRANTED. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is DENIED. // // DISCUSSION: Plaintiff Ken Houang moves for an order deeming the truth of matters stated in requests for admissions propounded to Defendant Rochelle Sterling as admitted, and for sanctions. Legal Standard When a party to whom requests for admission are directed fails to respond, the party propounding the requests may move for an order that the truth of any matters specified in the requests be deemed admitted. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(b).) The court shall make this order [deem the requests admitted], unless it finds that the party to whom the request for admissions have been directed has served, before the hearing on the motion, a proposed response to the requests for admission that is in substantial compliance with section 2033.220. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).) Analysis Plaintiff served Requests for Admissions on Defendant Rochelle Sterling via electronic service on February 15, 2024. (Declaration of Gerald S. Ohn ISO Mot. Exh. A.) Defendant served a response on April 16, 2024, which stated, in its entirety: Defendant BEVERLY HILLS PROPERTIES, LLC hereby makes a special appearance on behalf of Rochelle Sterling, an individual, who is not a party to this litigation, in response to pending Requests for Admission propounded to her in her individual capacity. To the extent these requests were propounded to her as an individual, Rochelle Sterling, the individual, is not a party to this litigation nor does she own the property as an individual. Defendant Rochelle Sterling as trustee for the Sterling Family Trust has no personal knowledge of any of the information necessary to respond to these requests and as such, is unable to respond. These identical requests were also propounded to Beverly Hills Properties, LLC whose responses are served concurrently. (Ohn. Decl. Exh. B.) The response was not accompanied by a verification. Plaintiff contends that he is therefore entitled to an order deeming the truth of the matters stated in the requests for admissions because Defendant Sterling failed to provide a valid substantive response to the Requests. As Plaintiff states, unverified responses to discovery requests are tantamount to no responses at all. (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 622, 636.) Defendant argues that this motion is improper because she provided objection-only responses. Objection-only responses do not require a verification to be considered a valid response to discovery. (Appleton, supra, 206 Cal.App.3d at 636.) Here, however, Defendant did not serve objection-only responses; Defendant served responses indicating that she lacked sufficient information to respond. This is a substantive answer to a request for admission, notwithstanding that the response does not contain the required statement that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter . . . has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable the party to admit the matter. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.320(b)(3); (c).) Consequently, verification of that answer was required under Appleton to be considered a valid response. Because no verification was provided, Defendant failed to respond to the requests. Defendants contention in her opposition that she served substantive responses on July 24, 2024 is not sufficient to defeat this motion, because Defendant has not provided those responses to allow the Court to determine whether they are in substantial compliance, and because Defendant concedes that verifications were not provided for those supplemental responses. (Declaration of Taylor A. Wall ISO Opp. ¶ 8.) According to Plaintiffs reply papers, no verified supplemental response has been received as of July 31. (Supplemental Declaration of Gerald S. Ohn ISO Mot. ¶ 2.) Plaintiff is therefore entitled to an order deeming the truth of the matters stated in the Requests for Admissions. Sanctions Plaintiff also requests sanctions in the amount of $2,250 only against Defendant for failing to respond to the Requests for Admissions. Failure to respond or submit to an authorized method of discovery is a misuse of the discovery process for which sanctions may be imposed. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 2023.010(d); 2023.030(a).) Sanctions are mandatory on the party or attorney or both whose failure to serve a timely response to requests for admission necessitated a motion to deem requests for admissions as admitted. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2033.280(c).) Plaintiff requests $2,250 in sanctions against Defendant alone based on 1.5 hours actually incurred and 1.5 hours anticipated at $850 per hour. (Ohn Decl. ¶ 6.) However, the Court is not persuaded that sanctions properly lie against Defendant where the insufficiency in responses is premised on the absence of a verification. Rather, the Court considers the failure to provide a verification to be the responsibility of Defendants counsel. As Defendants counsel is not identified as a target of sanctions in the Notice of Motion, the Court is without authority to impose sanctions on the party it considers responsible for this failure. (Code Civ. Proc. § 2023.040.) Plaintiffs request for sanctions must therefore be denied. CONCLUSION: Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Order Deeming Truth of Matters Stated in Requests for Admissions is GRANTED. Plaintiffs request for sanctions is DENIED. Moving Party to give notice. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: August 7, 2024 ___________________________________ Theresa M. Traber Judge of the Superior Court Any party may submit on the tentative ruling by contacting the courtroom via email at Smcdept47@lacourt.org by no later than 4:00 p.m. the day before the hearing. All interested parties must be copied on the email. It should be noted that if you submit on a tentative ruling the court will still conduct a hearing if any party appears. By submitting on the tentative you have, in essence, waived your right to be present at the hearing, and you should be aware that the court may not adopt the tentative, and may issue an order which modifies the tentative ruling in whole or in part.

Ruling

NICHOLAS SABBAGH VS CULVER 12, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY

Aug 12, 2024 |22STCV38373

Case Number: 22STCV38373 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: 32 NICHOLAS SABBAGH, Plaintiff, v. CULVER 12 LLC, Defendant. Case No.: 22STCV38373 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: cross-defendants motion for summary judgment BACKGROUND On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff Nicholas Sabbagh (Sabbagh) filed this action against Defendant Culver 12 LLC (Culver), alleging causes of action for (1) unlawful retention of security deposit, (2) breach of lease, (3) negligence, and (4) conversion. Sabbagh alleges that he rented a unit from Culver and paid a $15,000 security deposit which was supposed to be returned upon termination of the tenancy. Sabbagh alleges that Culver improperly applied expenses against the deposit, resulting in nothing being returned to Sabbagh. Sabbagh alleges that this amounts to theft of the security deposit. On January 5, 2023, Culver filed a cross-complaint against Sabbagh, Sachin Tejas Bettadapur, Alexander Amir Rassouli, and Ashan Naik (collectively, the Tenants), alleging breach of lease. The Tenants resided in the same unit. Culver alleges that the Tenants caused extensive damages to the unit which required more than $18,000 to repair. Culver therefore applied the full security deposit of $15,000 towards the repair. The Tenants also allegedly kept a dog in violation of the no-pet provision in the lease. Culver sues for the damage caused to the premises by the Tenants and their dog. On March 15, 2023, Bettadapur, Rassouli, and Naik filed their own cross-complaint against Culver, which is substantively identical to Sabbaghs complaint. On May 16, 2024, the Tenants filed the instant motion for summary judgment against Culvers cross-complaint. Culver filed its opposition on July 26, 2024. The Tenants filed their reply on August 5, 2024. LEGAL STANDARD The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings. (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.) As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to establish each element of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS Culvers objections are overruled. DISCUSSION I. Right to Inspection Within a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy, or before the end of the lease term, the landlord shall notify the tenant in writing of the tenants option to request an initial inspection and of the tenants right to be present at the inspection. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(f)(1).) Here, the Tenants provided notice in June 2022 that they would not be renewing the lease. (UF 6.) The Tenants argue that Culver did not provide any notice afterwards of a right to inspection prior to the Tenants vacating the unit. (UF 8.) As a result, the Tenants argue they did not have the opportunity to cure defects to avoid deductions from the security deposit. The Tenants move for summary judgment of Culvers cross-complaint on the grounds that a landlord who fails to follow the statutory requirements cannot deduct any portion of the security deposit. II. Notice in the Lease However, as the Court found in ruling on the Tenants prior motion for summary adjudication, there is a triable issue over Culvers compliance with subdivision (f). (May 1, 2024 Order re MSA 5:11-6:2.) Specifically, Section 25(C) of the lease provides that [a]fter giving or receiving notice of termination of a tenancy . . . Tenant has the right to request that an inspection of the Premises take place prior to termination of the lease. (See Plntf.s Ex. 1.) A reasonable trier of fact may find that this constitutes the written notice required by subdivision (f). The statute provides that the notice must be provided either [w]ithin a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy, or before the end of the lease term. (Civ. Code, § 1950.5(f)(1).) The notice in the lease was provided before the end of the lease term. III. Legislative History The Tenants argue that a notice in the lease is not compliant because subdivision (f) requires a separate notice issued at the end of a tenancy, not at the beginning. The Tenants claim that the legislative history of subdivision (f) reveals the Legislatures intent to require a notice at the end of a tenancy. As an initial matter, resort to legislative history is appropriate only where statutory language is ambiguous. (Kaufman & Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 26, 29.) If there is no ambiguity in the language, we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute governs. (Ibid.) Here, as the Tenants themselves acknowledge, the statute unambiguously requires landlords to notify tenants in writing of their right to an initial inspection at a specific time: either within a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy for month-to-month agreements, or before the end of the lease term for fixed term leases. (Mtn. 6:6-10.) The statute plainly does not require the notice to be issued at the end of a tenancy. The phrase before the end of the lease term is unambiguous. Had the Legislature intended to require the inspection notice to be issued at the end of the lease term, it would have written that instead. In any event, the Tenants interpretation is unsupported by legal authority, and their conclusion does not follow from the legislative history. The Tenants point out that subdivision (f) was designed to ensure that tenants in both month-to-month tenancies and fixed-term tenancies are required to be notified of their right to an inspection. However, this reveals nothing about an intent to require the inspection notice to be issued at the end of a tenancy. The statutes plain language already ensures that both types of tenants receive the notice of inspection before their tenancy ends. The legislative history reveals nothing about an additional requirement for the notice to be issued at the end of the tenancy. The Tenants argue that a tenant is unlikely to notice or remember a specific provision in the lease at the beginning of their tenancy. Instead, according to the Tenants, there must be a separate notice at the end of a tenancy to properly remind the tenant of their right to an inspection. Nothing in the legislative history reflects a concern over the ability of tenants to recall notices issued early in a tenancy, and the Tenants cite no authority suggesting that the Legislature intended to impose an additional requirement for inspection notices to be issued at the end of a tenancy. Instead, the Legislature determined that notice is sufficient if it is given [w]ithin a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy, or before the end of the lease term. (See Civ. Code, § 1950.5(f).) The Legislature imposed no other requirement, and the Court will not write one into the statute on its behalf. (See California Correctional Peace Officers' Assn. v. State of California (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 646, 656 [the role of courts is to interpret the law, not insert what the Legislature has omitted].) Furthermore, one who signs an instrument which on its face is a contract is deemed to assent to all its terms. (Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting & Engineering, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1049.) The Tenants fail to explain why a tenant signing a lease should not be charged with awareness of all its terms, including notice of their right to an inspection. No legal authority suggests that tenants may selectively disregard terms in a lease based on the passage of time or their own recollection. The Tenants argue that landlords cannot be allowed to circumvent their notice obligations by including generic language in leases. Whether the notice in a given lease is too generic or vague to satisfy subdivision (f) is a triable issue subject to the facts of the particular case. A landlord could just as easily issue a separate notice that is vague and fails to properly inform the tenant of his right to inspect. The possibility that the lease in a given case may be vague or difficult to read does not justify categorically precluding lease terms from satisfying subdivision (f). Lastly, even when using legislative history to determine the meaning of a statute, courts must avoid an interpretation that would lead to absurd consequences. (In re M.A. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 143, 149.) The Tenants interpretation would mean that a landlord who receives a notice of termination must issue the inspection notice promptly enough so that it is within a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy, but also delay the notice until it is sufficiently at the end of the tenancy. There is no indication that the Legislature intended to impose this dual, contradictory requirement on landlords. IV. Surplusage The Tenants argue that portions of subdivision (f) would be rendered surplusage under Culvers interpretation. Specifically, the Tenants argue that if the inspection notice could be provided at any time before the end of the lease term, there would be no need to separately require notice within a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy. According to the Tenants, [e]very fixed-term lease would necessarily include a period before the end of the lease term, making the reference to notice after an intent to terminate wholly superfluous. (Mtn. 10:20-23.) However, the Tenants cite no authority to support this interpretation. Moreover, as the Tenants themselves acknowledge, the two phrases in subdivision (f) address two different types of tenancies, month-to-month and fixed-term. Even if [e]very fixed-term lease would necessarily include a period before the end of the lease term, landlords in month-to-month tenancies would still have to provide notice of inspection within a reasonable time after notification of either partys intention to terminate the tenancy. Therefore, both phrases have meaning even if both do not apply in every circ*mstance. Hence the Legislatures use of the disjunctive or to denote two different possibilities. V. Landlords Right to Recover Damages Separately, the mere fact that the landlord has lost the right to take advantage of the summary deduct-and-retain procedure of section 1950.5, subdivision (f)[1], does not lead to the conclusion that he has lost all right to claim damages for unpaid rent, repair, and cleaning. (Granberry v. Islay Investments (1995) 9 Cal.4th 738, 745.) Instead, a landlord who has failed in good faith to take advantage of the summary nonjudicial deduct-and-retain procedure allowed under section 1950.5, subdivision (f), may recover damages for unpaid rent, repairs and cleaning (§ 1950.5, subd. (e)) in a subsequent judicial proceeding provided that he proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he has suffered such damages and that the amount claimed is reasonable. (Id. at pp. 749-50.) Although it addressed a different subdivision, Granberry suggests that a landlords failure to follow the statutory requirements does not automatically bar all possibility of recovery for damages to the premises. Thus, Culvers cross-complaint for damages to the unit cannot be dismissed solely on the ground that Culver failed to abide by subdivision (f). Instead, as held in Granberry, a landlord may still recover damages for unpaid rent, repairs and cleaning, given proof that the landlord acted in good faith, that he has suffered damages, and that the amount claimed is reasonable. (Granberry, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 749-50.) These are all factual matters. In sum, there is a triable issue over whether Culver complied with Civil Code section 1950.5(f). Additionally, a violation of the statute does not necessarily preclude all recovery in the cross-complaint. Thus, summary judgment is unwarranted. CONCLUSION The motion for summary judgment or adjudication filed by Cross-Defendants Nicholas Sabbagh, Sachin Tejas Bettadapur, Alexander Amir Rassouli, and Ashan Naik is DENIED. [1] The subdivision (f) referenced in Granberry is codified as subdivision (g) in the current version of section 1950.5.

Ruling

CITY OF CORONA vs ROYAL RIDGE INVESTMENT INC

Aug 11, 2024 |RIC2003117

MOTION PURSUANT TO CIVILCITY OF CORONA VS ROYALRIC2003117 PROCEDURE CODE SECTIONRIDGE INVESTMENT INC.1260.040Tentative Ruling:GRANT. Overrule all of City’s evidentiary objections.Royal and Lucky Oil assert that the elimination of the dedicated left-turn lane is analogous to adirect taking of access, citing People v. Ricciardi (1943) 23 Cal,2d 390 and Dept. of Pub. Wks. v.Thompson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 13, 25. This argument is not persuasive. The Project is not takingRoyal and Lucky Oil’s access to the public streets but rather changing the configuration of thataccess. The question here is whether or not the elimination of the left-turn lane will substantiallyimpair Royal and Lucky Oil’s access. There is no dispute that the elimination of the left turn lanewill affect access to Royal and Lucky Oil’s property. City asserts that the Project will not causesubstantial impairment of access from the lane’s removal and falls within its police powers, andtherefore is noncompensable. Royal and Lucky Oil assert that the elimination of a dedicated left-hand turn lane, protected by a traffic light, will substantially impair access to its property andtherefore goes beyond a simple exercise of the police power and its loss can be included inconsidering severance damages.“[W]hether access to a property has been “substantially impaired” for purposes of determiningseverance damages is a question for the court, even though ‘[s]ubstantial impairment cannot befixed by abstract definition; it must be found in each case upon the basis of the factual situation.’[Citation,]” (City of Perris v. Stamper (2016) 1 Cal.5th 576, 594) This is true even if the court mustexamine the factual circ*mstances (as the legal question is really a mixed issue of law and fact)to rule on the matter. (City of Perris v. Stamper (2016) 1 Cal.5th 576, 594)“The compensable right of an abutting property owner is to direct access to the adjacent streetand to the through traffic which passes along that street. [Citation.] If this basic right is notadversely affected, a public agency may enact and enforce reasonable and proper trafficregulations without the payment of compensation although such regulations may impede theconvenience with which ingress and egress may thereafter be accomplished, and maynecessitate circuity of travel to reach a given destination. In the proper exercise of its police powerin the regulation of traffic, a state or county may do many things which are not compensable toan abutting property owner, such as constructing a traffic island, placing permanent dividing stripswhich deprive an abutter of direct access to the opposite side of the highway, painting doublewhite lines on the highway, or designating the entire street as a one-way street. A property ownerhas no right to compensation because traffic is rerouted or diverted to another thoroughfare eventhough the value of his property is substantially diminished as a result.” (People v. Ayon (1960)54 Cal.2d 217, 224.) Here, Royal and Lucky Oil’s right of direct access to and from their parcel toMcKinley Street has not been substantially impaired. Although Royal and Lucky Oil’s customerswill be inconvenienced in their ingress and egress from the gas station, necessitating a circuitousre-routing that requires them to travel further to access the gas station, the court finds that Royaland Lucky Oil are not substantially impaired and therefore entitled to additional damages as aresult of the elimination of the left-turn lane. Motion is GRANTED.

Ruling

MAGDI MEKARI, ET AL. VS ARMAN AGAJANYAN, ET AL.

Aug 12, 2024 |19SMCV00818

Case Number: 19SMCV00818 Hearing Date: August 12, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Magdi Mekari, et al. v. Arman Agajanyan, et al., Case No. 19SMCV00818 Hearing date: August 12, 2024 Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Judgment (UNOPPOSED) Plaintiffs leased commercial property to defendants on September 15, 2016, with the lease set to terminate September 30, 2021. Defendants failed to pay rent from February 2018. On July 26, 2021 this court issued a ruling after bench trial awarding plaintiffs $165,479 in back rent and $57,600 in damages. Plaintiffs now move for an order determining that LA Mattress Store Inc. is the alter ego of defendant Los Angeles Mattress Plus, Inc. under CCP § 187. No opposition has been filed. Mekaris request for the court to take judicial notice of the August 11, 2021 judgment (Exh. 1) is granted under Evid. Code § 452(d) because it is a court document. Mekaris requests for the court to take judicial notice of 1) the business search report of LA Mattress Store Inc.; 2) the business search report for Los Angeles Mattress Plus, Inc.; 3) LA Mattress Stores May 12, 2022 Statement of Information; and 4) Los Angeles Mattress Plus, Inc.s November 30, 2022, Statement of Information (Exh. 2-5) are granted under Evid. Code § 452(c) because they are documents of the Secretary of State. Mekaris request for the court to take judicial notice of LA Mattress Store Inc.s webpage is granted under Evid. Code § 452 (h) because it is a fact not reasonably subject to dispute. Pursuant to CCP section 187, a trial court has jurisdiction to modify a judgment to add additional judgment debtors. Section 187 grants every court the power to use all means to carry its jurisdiction into effect, even if those processes are not set out in the code. Section 187 states: When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this Code. Code. Civ. Proc., § 187. Utilizing section 187, judgments are typically amended to add additional judgment debtors on the grounds that a person or entity is the alter ego of the original judgment debtor. This is an equitable procedure based on the theory that the court is not amending the judgment to add a new defendant but is merely inserting the correct name of the real defendant. Such a procedure is an appropriate and complete method by which to bind new individual defendants where it can be demonstrated that in their capacity as alter ego of the corporation they in fact had control of the previous litigation, and thus were virtually represented in the lawsuit. See NEC Electronics Inc. v. Hurt (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 772, 778; see also Greenspan v. LADT, LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 486, 508. Plaintiffs argue LA Mattress Store Inc. is the alter ego of Los Angeles Mattress Plus, Inc. because the principals, store locations and operations of each entity are the same. Both the business search records and statements of information show the entities share Arman Agayanyan as the chief executive officer. Mekaris declaration states he is certain two of the store locations for LA Mattress were also stores for Los Angeles Mattress Plus, and both entities shared the same number. Mekari Decl. ¶4. This does not conclusively prove the entities are the same, or alter egos of one another, because it does not establish one company dominated the finances, policies, and practices of the affiliated companies, which were conduits of the production company and had no "mind, will, or existence" of their own. Toho-Towa Co., Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 CA4th 1096, 1109. Plaintiffs have not established a unity of interest between the entities or that an inequitable result would follow if the nonparty alter ego were not added. The court will continue the matter for additional evidence, should plaintiff request.

Document

Jpmorgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Joan Stancarone A/K/A JOAN S. STANCARONE, David Businelli A/K/A DAVID BUSINELLI, New York City Parking Violations Bureau, United States Of America O/B/O Internal Revenue Service, New York State Department Of Taxation And Finance, New York City Transit Adjudication Bureau, New York City Environmental Control Board, John Doe #1-5, Jane Doe #1-5 Said Names Being Fictitious, It Being The Intention Of Plaintiff To Designate Any And All Occupants, Tenants, Persons Or Corporations, If Any, Having Or Claiming An Interest In Or Lien Upon The Premises Being Foreclosed Herein